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1 Introduction
The fact that authoritarian regimes rely on the
State Security Investigations apparatus (SSI) or
the political police to exercise hard and soft
power to rule is not new (Das Gupta 1978;
Bruneau and Dombroski 2006; Matei 2007;
Rathmell 1996; Zirker and Redinger 2003).
However, what is argued here is that the SSI was
more than that – authoritarian regimes were
able to pursue political liberalisation without
democratisation (or loss of their control)
precisely through the backstage governance role
of the SSI. By relying on the visible and invisible
powers of the SSI to control political space and
policy processes, regimes were able to commit to
good governance that require changes in the
institutional set-up of formal state agencies,
without changing the underlying power
structures. Donors supporting good governance
in Egypt have sought to ignore the elephant in
the room – the SSI, a formal institution playing
an informal, unofficial and illegitimate role in
governance. In some cases, this not only led to a
facade of good governance in the making, but it
also empowered the SSI to enlarge its powers.
The SSI often created artificial political spaces
for donor-led project implementation, but then
used them instrumentally to infiltrate, control
and co-opt processes of political and social reform.
Moreover, the security culture’s impact on
governance was so insidious that even after the
removal of the authoritarian leader (Mubarak)
and the formal disbandment of the SSI, civil
servants still operated as if the SSI had a
governing role. This article will argue that this
bears implications not only for the approaches to
understanding and analysing governance, but
also for policy interventions in authoritarian or
semi-authoritarian countries more generally
where actors perform public authority functions
which they were not formally or legally
mandated to assume.
The article is based on ethnographic field studies
and semi-structured interviews undertaken
between 2009 and 2011, a secondary literature
review in scholarship produced in Arabic and
English, and informal conversations with
informants whose identities have been concealed
for security reasons.
2 Frameworks of governance that ignore the
‘elephant in the room’
Paradigmatically and programmatically, good
governance as a normative framework has come
to mean different things, depending on whose
agenda is being advanced. In Egypt, as with
many other countries in the South, the concept
and practice of good governance was that
endorsed by the World Bank (and funded by the
World Bank, USAID, EU) and which took on
different versions of it once adopted by other
donors (such as UNDP). In effect, it
characterised a minimalist approach to
governance that focused on the rules and
institutions, stability and predictability of the
management of a country’s economic resources
for developmental purposes (defined in terms of
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thrive). It is minimalist insofar as its primary
focus is on the quality of institutions:
Governance consists of the traditions and
institutions by which authority in a country is
exercised. This includes the process by which
governments are selected, monitored and
replaced; the capacity of the government to
effectively formulate and implement sound
policies; and the respect of citizens and the
state for the institutions that govern economic
and social interactions among them. 
(World Bank 2011)
The dimensions of this definition can be gleaned
from the indicators drawn by the World Bank,
whereby good governance is conceived of as:
i voice and accountability (measured in terms
of the extent to which a country’s citizens
are able to participate in selecting their
government, as well as freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and a free media).
ii political stability and absence of violence
(assessed in terms of the perceptions of the
likelihood that the government will be
destabilised or overthrown by
unconstitutional or violent means, including
domestic violence and terrorism).
iii government effectiveness (perceptions of
the quality of public services, the quality of
the civil service and the degree of its
independence from political pressures, the
quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to such policies).
iv regulatory quality (perceptions of the ability
of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations
that permit and promote private sector
development).
v rule of law (perceptions of the extent to
which agents have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society, and in particular the
quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as
the likelihood of crime and violence).
vi control of corruption (perceptions of the
extent to which public power is exercised for
private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of
the state by elites and private interests).
(Kaufmann et al. 2010)
The indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2010) show that
if we compare Egypt’s profile for 2000, 2005 and
2010, we note that for voice and accountability,
Egypt has continuously been in the lowest 25th
percentile world ranking, but has gone down in
2010 compared with 2005 and 2000. For political
stability, there is also a decline in 2010 compared
with the previous decade and a drop from being
the 25–50th percentile, to the lowest percentile
rank. For government effectiveness and
regulatory quality, there is a slight drop in 2010
from 2000 and 2005; however, for the rule of law,
the indicators suggest that it is more or less the
same as 2000, although slightly lower than 2005
and for control of corruption, slightly better than
2005, although lower than 2000 (World Bank
2011). Yet, if we take into account the role of the
SSI as substituting for the legal channels of
pursuing and acquiring justice (as will be shown
below), the situation for Egypt would indicate a
drop in rule of law as well. It is highly significant
that in measuring all of these dimensions of good
governance in the country profile assessments,
the SSI is never mentioned as a central actor
assuming governance roles, despite its very
conspicuous role.
These indicators suggest that governance is
promoted as a means of improving economic
performance rather than as a goal in itself.
Governance has instrumental value insofar as
it provides producers and households with
greater clarity on the rules of the game and
investors with greater assurance that they can
appropriate the returns to their efforts. That
is the essential point that the institutions and
growth literature has emphasized. It is also
the main rationale for thinking of governance
reform in the context of growth strategies.
(Rodrik 2008: 19)
What is argued here is that while institutions
count, the focus in this good governance
approach’s conception, measurement and
analysis of the formal relationships and state of
government institutions is inadequate at
exposing the situation on the ground accurately
in a country like Egypt because it fails to capture
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the dynamics of one of the most influential
actors to shape the governance regime – the
State Security Investigations apparatus (SSI).
The SSI influences governance through mostly
backstage mediation of relations, hierarchies and
processes, whether it is within the government or
outside. Before examining the role of the SSI in
governing the country, a profile of the agency will
be briefly described.
Since its establishment by the British colonial
powers in 1910 as a secret service, the political
police (or SSI) has experienced a series of
waxing and waning in its function in society and
relationship to the ruling regime (see Tadros
2011 for a brief history). During Mubarak’s
reign, the SSI was propped up by an Emergency
Law, an instrument which has often been used by
the authoritarian regime in Egypt (and
commonly used in other countries as well for
similar purpose) to enforce the status quo through
undemocratic means. The Emergency Law was
in effect in Egypt from 1981 until the demise of
the Mubarak regime in February 2011 and was
then reinstated by the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces (SCAF) in September 2011.
During Mubarak’s reign, the law was used for
incarcerating citizens without arrest warrant and
without justification. The state security courts
(run by state security investigations officers who
have received legal training) served as a parallel
system for administering the rule of law for cases
seen as posing a threat to national security. As
with all authoritarian regimes, national security
was reduced to defending and protesting the
interests of the ruling regime and in particular,
the President. The SSI was dissolved in March
2011; however it was substituted with another
apparatus, the National Security, also headed by
SSI generals. The new apparatus vowed to limit
its role to combating terrorism and not to
encroach upon citizens’ freedoms. However,
there are already clear signals that this is not the
direction it pursues on the ground. This article
will focus on the period of SSI’s heightened role
in governance in the last decade of Mubarak’s
reign, although there will be spillover into the
transition phase that followed.
During Mubarak’s reign, the SSI was technically
answerable to the Minister of Interior, yet in
practice it often had open communication lines
with the President himself. Nonetheless, as in
other police states, it was also competing for
power with a variety of other security forces and
in particular with the Intelligence Services of the
Army (al-Mukhabarat al-‘Askariyya). Up to the
demise of Mubarak, it was led by General
Hassan Abd el Rahman who also held the title of
deputy to the Minister of Interior. SSI officers
were selected along very discerning criteria.
Unlike officers who joined the ranks of the
general police and who may have greatly varying
levels of education and class, their SSI
counterparts tended to come from the well-to-do
classes and were often highly educated, holding
Masters degrees and above. They were often sent
to Europe and the USA to be trained in the best
universities and were far better paid than their
counterparts in the police force. While the
officers who were responsible for certain files (in
particular political dissidents and the Islamists)
were infamous for using torture and cruel means
of information extraction, the SSI officers who
engaged with political parties, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), intellectuals and others
tended to be (often) very well spoken and seem
very ‘cultured’. However, they have also tended
to work in an institutional culture which
incentivised and rewarded allegiance to the
regime and their promotion was often directly
linked to identifying, subverting and eliminating
political threats to the regime.
The shift in SSI’s function in rule and governance
took place around the mid-2000s. This was when
the role of the SSI began to expand, infiltrate
every space, and become more visible in its
dealings. While no correlative relationship can be
established between increased political
liberalisation and the expansion of the SSI, it is
highly significant that it was in the mid-2000s that
the Egyptian government, pressed by the Bush
administration’s earlier drive to promote
democratisation in the Arab world, witnessed a
relaxation of the political inhibitions on public
space. There was also a tangible widening of
liberties associated with the media, the press, the
NGO sector (in particular human rights
organisations) and the emergence of political
movements, such as Kifaya (Enough), directly
contesting the President’s leadership. The
expansion of SSI’s role also coincided with Gamal
Mubarak’s rise to political power in the ruling
National Democratic Party and his assumption of
more public roles. The SSI became Gamal
Mubarak’s right arm, advising him on strategic
political steps forward and repressing his enemies.
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The SSI relied on a combination of strategies
deploying hard and soft power to govern the
expanded political space. In addition to the
practice of torture, indefinite incarceration and
disappearance, which had become standard
practice, as well as the unaccountable
administration of (in)justice of the State Security
courts, the SSI also sought to legitimise its
actions by assuming a patriotic image in the
media and the press. For example, it launched
via the press and media, sustained attacks on
characters and organisations which it sought to
repress, representing such actions as defending
national interests against Western hidden
agendas. In some cases, character assaults
reached the point of shaming them as national
traitors for associating with Western actors.
The SSI governed through influencing both
agential and structural dynamics. In terms of
agency, the SSI heavily influenced processes of
rotation of power within the government, the
media and parliament based on the
recommendations of security reports. Ministers,
deputy ministers and management staff were
appointed or banished. Similarly, all heads of
governmental newspapers and Egyptian
broadcasting channels (television and radio),
deans, heads of department and presidents of
public universities were appointed through the
recommendations of the SSI. During the elections
of 2005 and 2010, the SSI played a key role at all
levels of the process: people were given security
clearances to nominate themselves, the SSI
intimidated and harassed the candidates and their
supporters from political forces and parties that it
did not wish to see win. In the last parliamentary
election during Mubarak’s reign, November 2010,
the SSI did not only govern the parliamentary
outcome by supporting or undermining
candidates, they took on a more proactive role by
nominating themselves for office. One writer
pointed out that this parliamentary round (that
was supposed to be 2010–14) was one which had
the highest representation from the security
sector (Amin 2010).
Moreover, since SSI officers (forcibly) retired
very young, they were often rewarded for their
services through their appointment as governors.
While the political clout of a former SSI governor
was far less than that of an SSI officer in service,
it was still one way to influence governance at
the sub-national level. As with other police
states, the SSI did not only rely on its officers but
also on a vast network of informers occupying
within and outside all institutions.
From a structural or institutional point of view,
the SSI governed by directly substituting the
incompetent over-inflated bureaucracies of the
various Ministries. Through parallel and informal
management, the SSI was efficient, organised and
lacking in the red tape that crippled citizens’
access to services. In the civil society arena, it was
able to establish its own human rights
organisations or at least gently prod desirable
candidates to set up their own foundations, with
the promise that they would facilitate the process
of registration, access to funds and freedom to
work without harassment. Through its infiltration
of opposition political parties, it was able to
support and empower activists within to contest
and challenge the leadership of the parties, and in
the process cause fragmentation and internal
dissent. Religious institutions, whether Muslim or
Christian, were heavily regulated by the unspoken
rules of providing the SSI engagement: in return
for information sharing, the SSI was supposed to
provide it with certain favours. For example, one
renowned writer, Sayed el Qemmi, who critically
questioned one of the prominent characters in
Islamic history was summoned by the General
Prosecutor of the State Security Investigations for
questioning, because Al Azhar, Egypt’s most
prominent Sunni establishment was dissatisfied
with his book and called upon the SSI to ban it. In
the case of the Coptic Christian Orthodox church,
to construct, renovate or even fix a toilet required
SSI’s permission (specific to non-Muslims). In
return, the SSI was supposed to obstruct and
prevent sectarian attacks against Christian places
of worship and property, which it often failed or
chose not to do (see Fawzy, this IDS Bulletin).
In essence, whatever the institution, the
organisation or movement, the SSI applied a
carrot and stick strategy of governing which had
become the normative framework for governing
relations between state and society, and within
society itself.
3 Manifestations of the SSI assumption of public
authority
The role of the SSI in governance was manifest
in terms of control over actors (their political
aggrandisement or marginalisation); policy
process (policies could only be issued based on
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the recommendation of ‘security reports’);
activities (elections, meetings and any activity
involving collective congregation whether for the
distribution of charitable hand-outs on feasts or
for holding a workshop on sex education in
school curricula needed prior security
notification and permission) and spaces (public
spaces were not open for collective citizen
engagement and were subject to regulation). In
effect, the SSI had assumed the core functions of
governance to create public authority or
‘protection from external threats, and managing
external relations; peaceful resolution of internal
conflicts; and providing or facilitating the
provision of a range of collective goods and
services (IDS 2010: 9). For example, the SSI was
seen as the key actor protecting the Egyptian
population from the external threat of terrorism.
It also managed all external relations vis-à-vis
donors and international actors, and directly
provided a number of services to its allies in the
form of repressing their opponents, while
providing direct services that would have been
the prerogative of national ministries such as the
Ministry of Social Solidarity, Ministry of
Manpower, Ministry of Education, etc.
The dynamics of the macro- and micro-
manifestations of the role of the SSI in governance
will be analysed here through four vignettes.
3.1 International programmes for governance
promotion and democracy
In the early 2000s, UNDP launched a human
rights capacity-building project targeting what it
called ‘the Community of Human Rights
Practitioners’. It prided itself on the fact that:
For the first time the Police Sector, the Law
Enforcement Sector and the Judiciary Sector
of the country have been exposed to systematic
training in human rights. Furthermore Media
and Civil Society Organizations have been
targeted, including the crucial group of
university students. The project so far reached
more than 30,000 individuals in awareness and
training activities and worked actively to reach
out to the broader community through events,
publication of books, newsletters and more.
(Ministry of International Co-operation and
UNDP n.d.)
The mid-term evaluation of the project concluded
that ‘the initiative helped increase the awareness
of human rights within all law enforcement
agencies which led to establishing special human
rights offices at the Office of Public Prosecutor as
well as in all Security Directorates in all
governorates’ (Ahmed 2009).The programme
may have increased awareness of human rights
among the security sector; the question is what
did they do with it? An informant that was
familiar with the programme as well as with the
SSI officers who attended, pointed out that the
training on human rights served to strengthen
the SSI’s effectiveness in surveying the work of
human rights in two critical ways: first, it
provided them with an easy way to familiarise
themselves with human rights culture and
organisations without much effort; and second, it
empowered them to put this knowledge into
practice by propping up their own human rights
organisations, led by cooperating human rights
activists. In some instances, the SSI approached
particular human rights activists, offered to
facilitate the process of registering an
organisation and the necessary permissions for
acquiring foreign funding. In other words, the SSI
was able to strategically capitalise on an
international programme intended to improve
governance by instrumentalising it for its own
ends, while giving the donor the semblance that it
had succeeded in achieving its goals.
3.2 Universities
The SSI controlled the state universities through
an elaborate system of plain clothes officers,
coordination with the university guards, the
control of its faculty and student leaderships and
the securitisation of the space itself. University
presidents and deans were handpicked by the
SSI, who retained the right (informal of course)
to veto candidates of whom they did not approve.
SSI reports served as a clearance or a bloc to the
appointment and promotion of faculty members
in universities or their election for leadership
positions within the university. Without prior
permission of the SSI, no university professor
employed in a state-owned university could
participate in an overseas conference or invite a
guest speaker from outside the university to take
part in a seminar (El Fagr 2006). It was on the
basis of SSI reports that students were given the
clearance to nominate themselves for student
union elections or found their names
mysteriously removed from the list of candidates.
If they objected, they could face incarceration or
worse. Consequently, when the Supreme
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Administrative Court ruled in favour of the
removal of the university guards inside the
university premises, Wael Al Ibrashy, a political
analyst, saw little reason to celebrate, arguing
that more repressive than the power of the
university guards is that of the SSI whose reports
determine the fate of university professors and
students alike (El Ibrashy 2010). The above
represents a case in point of the limitation of an
approach that establishes the quality of
governance exclusively on the basis of reforming
formal institutions and the formal determinants
of the rule of law. University guards had been
removed, but the informal, backstage hegemonic
hold of the SSI to regulate and govern the
university campus continued unchecked.
3.3 Governing labour force discontent
From 2005 onwards, Egypt witnessed a sustained
stream of public protests from labour and citizen
groups (see Ali, this IDS Bulletin). It was the SSI
who played the critical role in mediating
negotiations over their demands, not the formal
Ministries which technically had the only
prerogative to engage in the bargaining process.
For example, the workers of a textile industry in
Alexandria ended a three-day strike over their
financial fringe benefits and holidays only when
they negotiated a settlement with
representatives of the SSI and Ministry of
Manpower, although the latter did not play the
decisive role (Abou Shal 2007). Despite the fact
that the SSI had no legal capacity to respond to
their demands, such a role became a publicly
known and recognised one. In one instance, the
railway workers whose demands had been
accepted, thanks to the intervention of the SSI,
put a huge cloth placard, no less than five metres
by two metres in front of the main railway
station in Ramsis Square ‘thanking the SSI’ (Abd
el Fatah 2009). In effect, the SSI had come to
perform the role of mediating labour relations to
such an extent that both private and public
sector employers came to regularly call upon its
services when facing labour discontent (Workers’
Talk 2005).
3.4 Civil society organisations
Technically, NGOs were supposed to be governed
according to Law 84 of 2001, which empowers
the Ministry of Social Affairs with overseeing
(and intervening) in the affairs of NGOs. The
law has come under extreme attack for its
inhibitive nature in both governance and human
rights grey literature and scholarship (Tadros
2009). In practice, it was mainly the SSI, not the
Ministry or the law that governed NGOs.
Research undertaken with human rights,
women’s rights, religious (Muslim, Islamist and
Christian) and labour organisations all spoke of
very similar manifestations of the SSI’s
increasing visibility and expansion of power in
governance. A pattern emerged, which can be
summarised as follows (Tadros 2011):
z Every NGO activist/leader was now in contact
with a particular SSI officer, with whom they
liaised in the day-to-day management of its
affairs through direct contact on their cell
numbers. With the greater visibility of the SSI
from mid-2000 onwards, NGOs also spoke of a
closer working relationship with the SSI
officers. Whereas before, the SSI was the
hidden agency whose presence was irregularly
felt (but not seen or heard), it became a case
of the SSI officer being in regular contact with
the NGO through visits and phone calls,
sometimes on a weekly basis.
z Processes that were previously hidden became
visible and institutionalised. For example, if
an organisation wished to organise an event in
a hotel or any other public place, the hotel
would covertly call the SSI to be given the
go-ahead. In the last five or six years of the
Mubarak regime, the hotel would blatantly
ask the civil society representative: did you get
the permission of the SSI? Whether the event
was on the discussion of Egypt’s constitution
or the incorporation of sex education in high
school curriculums, it became standard
practice for the civil society organisation to
follow the unwritten rule of calling the SSI
directly for permission to hold the event.
z All NGOs pointed to the SSI substitution for
the Ministry of Social Solidarity in governing
and managing their affairs. The SSI became
responsible for providing the services that
would have conventionally been the domain of
the Ministry, such as approving registrations
of NGOs, their requests for funding, as well as
being the agency empowered to give
instructions for their closures. For example,
according to the NGO law, if the organisation
did not receive a reply to its application within
60 days, it could consider itself registered. In
reality, the decision was primarily in the hands
of the state security apparatus, which may
ignore the 60-day limit altogether, as it
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conducted a security check on each individual
member of the founding board and assembly
(El Borai 2003: 516). In the end, the security
forces might arrive at a decision to reject the
registration of the NGO after the 60-day
period expired, subjecting the Ministry of
Social Solidarity to the embarrassing position
of having a lawsuit waged against it without it
being the responsible party for the decision
(El Borai 2003: 513).1
Despite the SSI’s thorough and comprehensive
system of surveillance, service provision and
suppression of dissent, dissidents still found
innovative ways to circumvent SSI powers
through engaging in unruly – or unconventional
ways – of doing politics. For example, when the
security apparatus threatened to incarcerate
anyone who responded to the call for a general
protest on 6 April 2008, the organisers called
upon all citizens ‘to stay at home’ as a way of
protesting instead. In effect, hundreds of private
and public employees stayed at home that day.
Moreover, despite the intelligence information
that the SSI systematically collected, the fact
that it deemed political activism via Facebook as
too inconsequential for regime stability proved a
bad judgement, in retrospect (see Ezbawy, this
IDS Bulletin).
Yet, even after the ousting of President Mubarak
and the dismantlement of the apparatus in
March 2011, the modes of operation that they
have instituted continue to dominate governance
relationships. For example, two months after the
dismantlement of the SSI, one NGO activist
recounted that when she approached the civil
servant in the Ministry of Social Solidarity
requesting permission to accept a foreign grant
she had received for her organisation, the latter
informed her that she was unable to process her
application because in the absence of the SSI,
she would not know who to send it to. The
activist informed her that given the illegality of
the SSI’s role in overseeing NGOs’ applications
in the first place, she should follow the law
(which stipulates that if the NGO does not
receive a response within 60 days of applying for
a grant, it should consider the application for
receiving foreign funding accepted); however, the
ministry employee was entirely unconvinced and
refused to accept the application. In the end,
SCAF decided to take matters into their own
hands, and enforced a new regulation: any
application for foreign funding would have to be
approved by them.
Similarly, in the Truth and Investigations
Committee that was established to inquire into
an incident when a church under construction
was torched by a mob in Al Marinab, a village in
Aswan, Upper Egypt, in September 2011, the
committee met with a local official, Abd el
Fattah Zaghlool and asked him: did the church
have a legal licence? And Zaghlool answered ‘the
licence was one hundred per cent authentic but it
was granted without obtaining prior permission from the
State Security Investigations’ (Al Youm al Sab’i 2011).
The fact that seven months after the
dismantlement of the SSI civil servants are still
acting as if it existed, is highly significant.
4 Implications for the governance paradigm
The above depiction of the role of the SSI flags
the limitations of existing governance analytical
frameworks that focus on the institutions that
are formally mandated to govern. Clearly the
actors and relationships that influence processes
and outcomes are neither captured in such a
framework, nor accounted for. Four key
implications for rethinking the governance
paradigm are put forward:
z An institutional reform approach offers limited
scope for altering the power configurations in
contexts such as the ones described above
where government institutions can be
reformed but the possibility that power
relations may be altered are minimal.
z Ignoring backstage governance makes it
possible for highly predatory forces such as the
SSI to capture the initiatives made for
improving governance while giving the
semblance of progress towards good governance
(such as the example of the UNDP initiative).
z Power analysis seems critical to analysing
governance. Essentially, it means that
examining visible, invisible and hidden forms
of power can complement political economy
analysis to provide a more comprehensive
analysis of the relationships and processes,
both formal and informal, on the ground.
z The impact of the SSI on governance is not
one that desists once it is removed from power,
partly because while there has been a removal
of an authoritarian leader, the military regime
continues to rule. However, it is also about the
pervasive and insidious nature of these
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relations and consequently, the challenges to
‘undo’ or deconstruct this culture.
The implications of the above for the governance
paradigm is that a return to a strictly
institutional approach that relies on either the
reform of the ministries officially mandated with
governance or the reform of the security sector
(as part of the security agenda) will be
inadequate. Since the ouster of Mubarak, the SSI
has assumed a new name, however there are
concerns that it adopts informal roles in
governance under different pretexts. The
promotion of a governance agenda in a post-SSI
setting still requires that we broaden its
parameters conceptually and programmatically
by examining how the deeply embedded
understandings of governance inform daily
practice – even when they are coming from actors
who are not supposed to assume such roles.
5 Conclusion
This article has argued that while the good
governance paradigm has conventionally focused
on the reform of a government’s institutions
assumed to be exclusively responsible for
governing, and has assessed the quality of
governance in terms of mostly formal relations
and dynamics, this approach is limited
conceptually and policy wise in its ability to
capture the actors and processes that represent
another layer of governance, one does not
necessarily have the legal mandate to do so, is
less institutional and sometimes less visible. The
SSI’s role in governance has enabled Mubarak’s
regime to give semblance to Western powers that
there is a commitment to good governance and
democratisation, while circumventing the
possibility that such political openings will
represent a genuine threat to the status quo. This
article has argued that the SSI played a critical
role in governance through its exercise of power
over public authority, even if it was not legally or
officially empowered to do so. The SSI
substituted for a bloated and inefficient
bureaucracy and in the process, came to weaken
it. Often civil servants automatically referred
their work to the SSI rather than assume any
responsibility for it, sometimes out of ease,
sometimes crippled by fear that they may be
inadvertently sidestepping the security. This
substitution of the SSI by various ministries
became a public secret; for example NGOs
circumvented the formal channels of engaging
with Ministry of Social Solidarity employees and
addressed the SSI directly, thereby saving them
time and red tape. Yet the SSI never engaged in
a completely visible way; it continued to engage
through invisible and hidden strategies. Under
all circumstances, since it was bestowed with the
right to engage secretively and since technically
it was not supposed to be governing the country,
citizens were neither empowered to demand its
transparency nor accountability. The SSI’s
exercise of public authority had capacity but
lacked legitimacy and consequently attempts
from different quarters to circumvent, subvert
and resist its authority never ceased, even when
it had become deeply embedded in civil society.
The governance role for the SSI was not hidden
from international policymakers and donors.
They themselves commented on the heavy-
handedness of undue intervention when they
were allocated funding, and who they were and
were not allowed to engage with – and the
parameters of their space. Why did the SSI
interference in governance not become one of
the issues featuring in research reports and
public policy recommendations? The fact that
security interests supersede international
development policies may have much to do with
it. The SSI was the main organ empowered by
the regime to counter terrorism, and its officers
often received training in the very countries
which poured in millions for good governance
promotion. Hence, what is argued here is that
the limitation lies not only in the good
governance paradigm, its frameworks of analysis
and approaches to reform, but also in the conflict
of supporting politically oriented good
governance that may clash with wider and more
important geostrategic priorities.
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Notes
* The author is very grateful to Diana Conyers
for her helpful feedback on an earlier draft of
this paper.
1 For example, the Foundation for the Awlad al
Ard for Human Rights presented an
application for registration as an NGO to the
Ministry of Social Solidarity on 12 March 2003.
After the 60 days had expired, on 10 June
2003, they received a letter from the Ministry
of Social Solidarity confirming the state
security investigation authority rejection of the
registration of the NGO. The NGO founders
took the Ministry to court and won, obliging it
to accept its registration. In a similar incident,
the New Woman Foundation applied for
registration on 6 April 2003 and again, after
the expiry of the 60-day period, they received a
letter from the Ministry of Social Affairs on
8 June claiming that security objected to their
registration. Again, the administrative court
overruled this decision, recognising the right
of the organisation to be established. The
same applies to the foundation for the
Egyptian Center for the Right to Housing,
which sought registration with the Ministry of
Social Solidarity on 14 May 2003. After the
expiration of the 60 days, on 3 September, it
received a letter stating the security’s rejection
of its registration, again a decision which was
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